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Is Miami the “land of opportunity”? A “paradise lost”? A “sophisticated tropic” or a 
“banana republic”? Is it the “city of the future” or a “city on the edge”? Is Miami 
America’s Riviera or America’s Pretoria? Miami is all of these things – a composite of 
images that overlap and intersect, compete, and collide.1 
– Sheila Croucher, Imagining Miami 
 
For the past few decades, Miami has been characterized by popular media as a city filled 
with curiosities and dichotomies. The city’s transformation from a quiet, tourist vacation spot to 
a bustling, economic power is partly due to the massive influx of immigrants, primarily from 
Latin America, during the late twentieth and early twentieth-first centuries.2 Beginning with 
Cuban exiles in the 1960s, waves of Latin American immigrants shifted the city’s demographics. 
They usurped White Anglo dominance, demographically speaking, by evolving from an ethnic 
minority to an ethnic majority. No other city in the United States had experienced such a 
divergence from the typical ethnoracial patterns and models found in cities like Yankee City and 
Jonesville.3 
 
1 Sheila L. Croucher, Imagining Miami: Ethnic Politics in a Postmodern World (Charlottesville: University 
Press of Virginia, 1997), 172; Interestingly enough, Nelson Mandela toured Miami in 1990 to raise awareness of 
apartheid in South Africa and garner political and financial support for the African National Congress. Mandela’s 
visit, however, was met with resistance by Cuban political leaders, including Miami’s Mayor Xavier Suarez, 
because he referred to Fidel Castro as a “brother in arms.” See Liz Sly, “Mandela Snubbed in Miami,” Chicago 
Tribune, June 29, 1990, on Mandela’s reception in Miami and its implications for the city’s Cuban population. 
2 An Act to amend the Immigration and Nationality Act, and for other purposes, Public Law 89-236, U.S. 
Statutes at Large 49 (1965): 911-922. The 1965 Hart-Cellar Act banned the National Origins Formula that placed 
immigration quotas on race, ethnicity, and origins. While the Hart-Cellar Act is considered a turning point in the 
United States, refugee status was only available if an immigrant fled a “Communist or Communist-dominated 
country.” See Douglas S. Massey and Karen A. Pren, "Unintended Consequences of US Immigration Policy: 
Explaining the Post-1965 Surge from Latin America," Population and Development Review 38 (2012): 1–29, and 
Jorge Durand, Edward Telles, and Jennifer Flashman, “The Demographic Foundations of the Latino Population,” in 
Hispanics and the Future of America, ed. Faith Mitchell and Marta Tienda (Washington, D.C: National Academies 
Press, 2006), for more information on the legislation’s effect on Latin American immigration. 
3 Alejandro Portes and Alex Stepick, City on the Edge: The Transformation of Miami (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1994), 5-8; Michael Banton, “Ethnic Origin and Ethnicity,” in What We Now About Race and 
Ethnicity (New York: Berghahn Books, 2015). W. Lloyd Warner studied the Black communities in Yankee City 
(New England) and Jonesville (Midwest) to understand how “ethnic” differences contributed to class, assimilation, 
and upward mobility. He theorized an “ethnic” as someone outside a mainstream community and considered to be 
perceived as “distinct.” While scholars continue to debate a definition for “ethnicity,” a commonality between the 
various theories is rooted in self-perception and other groups’ perception. 
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For some immigrants, Miami was an escape from an oppressive communist government 
– a beacon of hope and opportunity for them to be successful and follow their “American 
Dream.” The conflict between “established” and “new” immigrants heightened the city’s 
complex inter-and intraethnic relations. Immigrant groups clash with one another as they each 
forge their path of success and opportunity, or, in other words, their American Dream. 
Competition ensues between the established White Cuban community and the city’s new Latin 
America as the former attempts to hold on to the power they have maintained since the 1980s. 
The symbolism and mythology behind the American Dream permeate Miami’s immigrant 
narratives and draws attention to its intersections of race, class, and ethnicity. Beyond the city’s 
sandy beaches and glistening waters, Miami’s unique character was, and continues to be, shaped 
by the crucible of immigration.4 
This essay will examine how opportunity has been perceived for Latin American 
immigrant groups and its changes over the decades since 1980 through the American Dream 
framework. The ethnoracial dynamics will be reevaluated to reflect Miami’s demographic 
changes over the last four decades and expand its ethnic and racial analysis by including other 
groups beyond its White Cuban majority. The 1980 Mariel Boatlift Crisis threatened the "Golden 
Exiles" narrative and ignited established White Cubans to seize the city’s control and become a 
dominant ethnic and racial group. Since then, White Cubans have maintained and upheld a 
hegemonic presence within the city and redefined opportunity, success, and the American Dream 
in Miami. With the influx of Latin American immigrant groups from different parts of the 
 
4 Miami, Miami-Dade County, and Miami-Dade will be used interchangeably throughout this essay, even 
though the City of Miami is only one city in the more extensive system of municipalities within Miami-Dade 
County. If a specific county, city, or municipality needs to be referenced, it will be specifically articulated instead of 
generalizing it under Miami. See John Stack and Christopher Warren, "Ethnicity and the Politics of Symbolism in 
Miami's Cuban Community," Cuban Studies 20 (1990): 11–28, for more information on Miami-Dade's metropolitan 
and city structures. 
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region, the "Cubanized American Dream" restricts other Latin American immigrant groups from 
achieving their opportunities unless it meets Cuban standards, raising the following question: 
Who is left out from the American Dream? 
 
Perceiving Miami in the Twentieth Century 
In 1979, President Jaime Roldòs Aguilera of Ecuador nicknamed Miami the "capital of 
Latin America" after visiting the city during the Trade Fair of the Americas. While the moniker 
may have been a slight exaggeration at the time, Roldòs Aguilera was prophesizing Miami’s 
transformation into being a thriving extension of Latin America.5 By 1985, Miami served 
markets in Latin America and the Caribbean, operating as a middleman between the United 
States and Europe. Barry B. Levine highlights the city’s economic prosperity: “If Miami were an 
independent nation, its gross national product ... would total some $23.5 billion, about the same 
as that of Chile.”6 
Miami was founded in July 1896 as a “tourist resort for wealthy families from the 
Northeast” after Julia Tuttle, an entrepreneurial businesswoman, convinced Henry Flagler, a 
renowned industrialist, to visit South Florida after sending him a bouquet of orange blossoms, 
proving the area was “frost free”7 Although apocryphal, Tuttle secured the city’s founding as 
 
5 Historians continue to debate Latin America’s definition, specifically which countries are classified as 
part of the region. The conflict over nomenclature is evident in individual perceptions, popular media, scholarly 
work, and United States Census records that each define it differently depending on the source. For instance, an 
interviewee may consider Latin America as Spanish-speaking countries while the United States Census will merge 
Hispanics and Latinx communities into one category. Differences in Latin America’s definition include language, 
colonial legacies, geopolitical study, regional locations, and perceptions by the Global North. This essay, in 
particular, will focus on Latin American immigrants that came from countries with histories of Spanish, Portuguese, 
and French colonization outside the Anglo-American region (i.e., Canada, United States) and located within Central 
America, South America, or the Caribbean.  
6 Barry B. Levine, “The Capital of Latin America,” The Wilson Quarterly 9, no. 5 (1985): 48. Although 
Roldòs Aguilera is typically credited with coining the nickname, similar metaphors and references to the city's 
connection to Latin America can be found in newspapers and literature throughout the decade. 
7 Ramon Grosfoguel, “World Cities in the Caribbean: Miami and San Juan,” in Colonial Subjects: Puerto 
Ricans in a Global Perspective (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 82-83; Portes and Stepick, City on 
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Flagler arrived shortly after that and promoted the city by establishing a newspaper – Miami 
Metropolis.8 Although Miami was not a metropolis yet in the early twentieth century, Miami 
attracted 11,000 permanent citizens and about 125,000 annual tourists, including Carl Fisher and 
George Merrick – the developers of Miami Beach and Coral Gables.9 All eyes were on the 
“Magic City” as the White industrialists built neighborhoods and roads while pushing out Black 
Americans and immigrants to the side. 
Over the course of the century, media outlets and notable figures continuously shaped 
Miami’s image by addressing it by a new moniker or nickname. For instance, Fortune magazine 
referred to the city as a “Paradise Regained” in its 1936 article headline because of its resort-like 
qualities that impressed the nation, including Al Capone, who called it the “Garden of 
America.”10 The city’s fascination persisted in the 1940s and 1950s as the introduction of air-
conditioning, according to Alberto Ibargüen, expanded Miami’s opportunity from being a 
seasonal paradise to a paradise all year long.11 However, the city’s charm, enjoyed by White 
elites, dimmed as the emergence of non-White ethnic immigrant enclaves tarnished the façade of 
escape, with Miami being referred to as a “Paradise Lost” and a “Third-World Country.”12 The 
changes in nicknames exemplify the growing perceptual conflict within Miami as both a city of 
 
the Edge, 62-63, 71-72. Before Tuttle’s bouquet, Flagler had arrived in Florida in 1883 and invested in a $1.25 
million resort in Saint Augustine and expanded the hotel chain by the 1890s. 
8 Raymond A. Mohl, "Shadows in the Sunshine: Race and Ethnicity in Miami," Tequesta: The Journal of 
the Historical Association of Southern Florida 49 (1989): 63; Portes and Stepick, City on the Edge. 
9 Mohl, “Shadows in the Sunshine: Race and Ethnicity in Miami; Portes and Stepick, City on the Edge, 71-
76. Miami’s tourist image is corroborated by the different architectural styles found across the city: Art Deco 
(Miami Beach), Neoclassical (Coral Gables), Moorish Revival (Opa-Locka), and Modernist (Brickell & 
Downtown). 
10 “Paradise Regained,” Fortune, January 1936. 
11 Alejandro Portes and Ariel C. Armony, The Global Edge: Miami in the Twenty-First Century (Oakland: 
University of California Press, 2018), 148. “In the late 1950s, Miami experience three trends that came together to 
create a ‘tipping point’: the advent of air-conditioning, the invention of jet propulsion, and the arrival of Cubans. 
The three had nothing to do with each other, but their convergence made the city what it is today.” 
12 Elizabeth Aranda, Rose E. Chang, and Elena Sabogal, “Racializing Miami: Immigrant Latinos and 
Colorblind Racism in the Global City,” in How the United States Racializes Latino, ed. José A. Cobas, Jorge Duany, 
Joe R. Feagin (New York: Routledge, 2009), 149-163. 
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distractions filled with glamor and glitz and a city of reality filled with racial and ethnic 
pressures and tensions, reflecting a push-and-pull in praise and criticism over the city.  
 
Defining Dreams Under the Sun 
Miami’s scholarship, however, has been primarily limited to studying the Cuban waves 
of immigration and their political, cultural, and economic effects on the city. On a broader scaler, 
scholarship in ethnic history and urban studies have primarily focused on cities like Los Angeles, 
New York City, and Chicago, specifically with the racial and ethnic tension with its White 
population. Miami’s limited academic interest overlooks the city’s complex, dichotomic 
intraethnic and interracial dynamics in a city that has historically been marketed as a luxurious 
vacation spot ready for investment and opportunity. Scholars omit the intersecting and 
multifaceted dynamics existing with the city by approaching the “capital of Latin America” from 
a sole-Cuban angle and omit an unusual case study where an ethnic minority gained, and 
continues to maintain, control over a major metropolitan city. 
Scholars in various fields, from sociology to urban studies to cultural historians, have 
been fascinated with the oddities of the Cubans and Cuban American stories in Miami since their 
earliest arrival in the 1950s. Compared to the other nationalities and ethnic groups in the city, 
Cubans went through a “relatively smooth political, economic, and social assimilation” that 
eased their transition into the United States, uniting under a common “exile identity and 
ideology.”13 Fulgencio Batista's overthrow in 1959 triggered a mass exodus from Cuba to the 
 
13 Croucher, Imagining Miami, 103; Guillermo J. Grenier, “The Creation and Maintenance of the Cuban 
American ‘Exile Ideology’: Evidence from the FIU Cuba Poll 2004,” Journal of American Ethnic History 25 (2006): 
209-224. Grenier argues that United States’ Cuban presence is comprised of three characteristics: the third-largest 
Latino community, a community of professionals and entrepreneurs, and a self-designated status as an exile 
community. 
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United States had ramifications on the country's, and subsequently Miami's, political, economic, 
and cultural landscape.14 The Cuban plight symbolized an escape from Fidel Castro's 
revolutionary communist government, becoming a focal point for scholars attempting to 
understand their liminal identity between Cuba and the United States. 
The strangeness of Miami's ethnoracial power dynamics is illustrated in Alejandro Portes 
and Alex Stepick's City on the Edge: The Transformation of Miami. Written in 1994, it is a 
foundational sociological text in examining and understanding the complexities behind a city 
nicknamed "the American Riviera." They highlight the city's transformation from a White-
dominated city in the early twentieth century to a Latin-dominated city after the mass migrations 
of Cubans and the more modest migrations of Nicaraguans and Haitians. Utilizing newspaper 
articles, interviews, and statistical data, Portes and Stepick demonstrate the ethnic tensions in 
Miami between the White, Black, and Latinx communities, specifically Cubans, and the conflict 
between them as they competed for the opportunity. They underscore how ethnic groups 
struggled to gain and maintain power within the city because of conflicting interests and the 
dominance by other groups, creating an ethnic hierarchy within Miami.15 
 Portes and Stepick's overarching question of "who rules Miami [in 1994]?" is left in 
limbo as they point out the different ebbs and flows of ethnoracial tensions within the city. They 
illustrate the ever-changing nature of the dynamics between the different groups to show the 
city’s complexities. While one group pushes for power and the other struggles, they are all 
 
14 María Cristina García, Havana USA: Cuban Exiles and Cuban Americans in South Florida, 1959 - 1994 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 1–3; Croucher, Imagining Miami, 32–40. Fulgencio Batista was the 
elected Cuban President from 1940 to 1944 and later the U.S.-backed military dictator from 1952 to 1959. He 
aligned with the Cuban elite, repressed political liberties, and opened the country to foreign development and 
investment. Batista had been known for representing dissenting ideas and censors the media, enacting wide-scale 
torture and violence in Cuba. 
15 Portes and Stepick, City on the Edge. The thin strip of land between jungle and reef hence became less an 
American Riviera than a compendium of the nation foibles." 
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caught in a tug-of-war battle to determine who has the upper hand. Although Portes and Stepick 
leave the question open-ended, they suggest that Cubans may play an even more significant role 
in the city’s transformation, shifting the question from “who rules?” to “why do they rule?”16 
Miami has changed significantly since Portes and Stepick originally published City on the 
Edge in 1994.17 Starting in the 1990s, the city has experienced massive amounts of immigration 
from countries all over Latin America, especially after the emergence of leftist governments 
during the Pink Tide.18 Ina similar fashion to Cubans, immigrants were finding themselves 
fleeing socialist and communist government for the United States in an attempt to establish 
opportunity and chase the American Dream. White Cubans replaced non-Latin White dominance 
after 1980 by populating political its adjacent sectors in Miami in response to Cuban migration 
changes and a reinforced finality in their stay. The emergence of newly arrived Latin Americans 
added to the pre-existing ethnic and racial tension within the city as established White Cuban 
communities was forced to reconcile and make room for other Caribbean islanders, Central 
Americans, and South Americans. Both groups followed similar immigration patterns, yet the 
newly-arrived Latin Americans had to deal with an existing Latin establishment. The Latin 
establishment, in reality, was more of a White Cuban establishment that pushed for the success 
and opportunities of White Cubans with similar socioeconomic and exile backgrounds, 
 
16 Portes and Stepick, 4, 215-219. Portes and Stepick's central question of "Who Rules?" refers to Robert 
Dahl's Who Governs? (1961) and builds upon his work alongside Floyd Hunter and C. Wright Mills. According to 
the authors, Dahl's analysis of ethics politics is centered on how political power socializes immigrants into 
participating in mainstream institutions and allows them to feel included. 
17 Portes would later write a follow-up to City on the Edge in 2018 with Ariel C. Armony: The Global 
Edge: Miami in the Twenty-First Century. The book picks up where Portes and Stepick left off in 1994 and explores 
Miami under the context of globalization by examining changes in its economic structure.  
18 Alfonso Chardy, “Wealthy Latin Americans Immigrants Seek Refuge in South Florida,” The Miami 
Herald, August 12, 2000, 333 edition. The Pink Tide is a movement by Latin American governments to "turn to the 
left" toward leftist policies and away from neoliberalism. The wave was led by Hugo Chávez of Venezuela, elected 
in 1998, and followed by Cristina Fernández de Kirchner of Argentina in 1999, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of Brazil 
in 2003, and Evo Morales of Bolivia in 2006. 
 8 
marginalizing and excluding Afro-Cubans. Like how other ethnic and racial groups in the city 
felt Cuban dominance, newly arrived Latin Americans would begin to feel comparable tensions 
as they attempt to reestablish their opportunities in Miami – a city already filled with competing 
groups. 
However, Miami’s ethnic and racial makeup has expanded beyond the tri-ethnic approach 
outlined by Portes and Stepick.19 The tri-ethnic landscape oversimplifies the complexities behind 
ethnic and racial identities by fitting individuals into three separate boxes. It fails to consider 
multifaceted identities and how they contribute to the tension within and outside a community. 
For example, Afro-Latinx people exist in two categories according to the tri-ethnic approach: 
Black and Latinx; yet they are racialized differently by both groups because of their national 
origin, skin color, and dialect or language.20 The framework oversimplifies the ethnoracial 
dynamics within Miami and categorizes ethnic groups into a monolithic contrived identity box. 
The three ethnic categories also omit the other Latin American groups that make up the city's 
demographics. To understand Miami’s evolving interethnic and ethnoracial relations, it is crucial 
to reexamine how ethnic groups are classified and how those classifications unveil conflicts in 
 
19 Portes and Stepick, City on the Edge, xii–xiv; Croucher, Imagining Miami, 55–57; Sheila Croucher, 
“Miami in the 1990s: ‘City of the Future’ or ‘City on the Edge’?”, Journal of International Migration and 
Integration 3 (2002): 225-226. Although Portes and Stepick do not explicitly refer to their methodology as a "tri-
ethnic approach," they frame their analysis as such by explicitly dividing their sources into three categories: Anglo, 
Black, and Cuban. Croucher briefly touches upon this approach and criticizes its generalization over the 
aforementioned ethnic groupings.  
20 References to Latinx, Latino, or Hispanic are a contentious issue within academic and personal circles 
because of each term’s subjectivity and origins. Latinx is a gender-neutral term that has been used in recent years, 
mainly among young generations in the United States, to combat the gendering of the Spanish language with 
Latino/a. On the other hand, Hispanic is a contrived identity marker implemented by the United States in 1976 for 
U.S. Census data collection purposes that Latin Americans often reject for its imperial undertones. This essay will 
use Latinx and Latin American interchangeably when referring to the broad ethnic and racial group. Hispanic will be 
used sparingly and only about self-identified markers by individuals, demographic data, and quoting a source. See 
"The Politics of Ethnic Construction: Hispanic, Chicano, Latino...?", Latin American Perspectives 10, no. 4 (1992) 
for more work on the deconstruction and politicization over the Hispanic/Latinx ethnic identity markers and Ed 
Morales, Latinx: The New Force in American Politics and Culture (New York: Verso, 2018), on the origins of 
Latinx and its adjacent terminology.  
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opportunity with other groups.  The increase in Latin American immigration from all over the 
region raises Portes and Stepick's question again about who rules Miami and who is left out. 
However, the question must be reimagined by thinking about how Cubans’ dominance infringes 
on other Latin Americans’ opportunities.21 
A useful conception of immigrant opportunity can be found in the national ethos known 
as the American Dream. Initially written in The Epic of America by James Truslow Adams in 
1931, the American Dream is described as the "dream of a land in which life should be better and 
richer and fuller for everyone, with opportunity for each according to ability or achievement."22 
The American Dream stems from a patriotic need to define a communal ideology that can be 
shared amongst Americans to achieve their "pursuit of happiness." The need to form a unifying 
ideology and myth is based on elevating American exceptionalism in contrast to other countries 
across the world, especially those that fail to meet the criteria of democracy, freedom, and 
opportunity. Like the United States, a heterogenous society facilitates ideological unity in 
holding the country together as it searches and locates shared values within its citizens.     
Expanding on this phenomenon, Wendy Wall's Inventing the American Way draws 
connections between four similar, yet distinct ideologies rooted in American exceptionalism: the 
American Dream, American Way, American Creed, and American Character.23 Although 
 
21 While this essay will explore Latinx perceptions based on an ethnic framework, it is critical to note the 
constructions behind race and ethnicity in the United States differ from Latin America. Race in the United States is 
contrived on a binary between White and Black in which the former is normalized while the latter is racialized based 
on its difference and proximity to Whiteness. Under the scope of U.S. racial constructions, Latin Americans are 
racialized and viewed as “not White” because they exist outside of Whiteness in some fashion. With that being said, 
White Latin Americans may still experience privilege based on White, Eurocentric features compared to Latin 
Americans with Black and Indigenous/Native features. The construction of Latinx identity is examined in Laura E. 
Gómez, Inventing Latinos: A New Story of American Racism (New York: The New Press, 2020). She argues that 
racial and ethnic identity is not mutually exclusive and reexamines where Latin Americans fit in U.S. racial 
hierarchy.  
22 James Truslow Adams, The Epic of America (Safety Harbor, Florida: Simon Publications, 2001). 
23 Wendy Wall, Inventing the “American Way”: The Politics of Consensus from the New Deal to the Civil 
Rights Movement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 16–17. 
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different in name, all of these concepts emerge from a need to define, create, and unite under 
Americanism. Wall presents all four ideologies by discussing their connections to capitalism, 
democracy, and anti-communist stances to contextualize and establish synonyms for 
Americanism.24 It was and continues to be critical for the United States to espouse Americanism 
internationally to both enemies and allies to create an image of unity for the rest of the world. 
The criteria, however, changed with every decade as an understanding of "what is America?" 
changed as Americans "[worked] assiduously to shape the answer."25 
Although Wall's examination of the effects and symptoms of Americanism is limited to 
the early to mid-twentieth century, the ideas of communal ideology and patriotism continue to be 
applicable post-Civil Rights era, especially with the influx of immigrant groups to the United 
States. Wall additionally cites notable examples of how the United States implemented programs 
that espoused American exceptionalism during the early Cold War, including the “Letters to 
Italy” campaign.26 In an attempt to shift public sentiment against communism, the United States 
relied on first- and second-generation citizens to speak on the country’s “democratic” values and 
developing rhetoric that revered the country. It allows new generations to be included in the 
country’s definition of an “American” by involving new people who may otherwise have not 
viewed themselves as American. In particular, ambassadorship can be applied to Latin American 
immigrant groups that left their home countries for the United States.27 Their pursuit of the 
American Dream offers them the opportunity to be staunch proponents of the U.S. values in their 
communities, both domestically and internationally, and elevating the country's status as the land 
 
24 Wall, 185, 255. 
25 Wall, 290. "This book suggests that the story is a bit more complex – than Americans of that era were 
indeed united, but above all by a quest for common ground. They too asked the question 'Are We Really One 
County?' and they worked assiduously to shape the answer." 
26 Wall, 242-243. 
27 Wall, 244. 
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of opportunity and success. The United States, in turn, is mythologized as a “promise land” for 
immigrants in hopes they can work hard and build themselves up, like Horatio Alger and 
Andrew Carnie, and embrace values of economic success – a value that captivated the hearts and 
desires of Cuban exiles.28 
 
1980 Mariel Boatlift Crisis 
In April 1980, Miguel Ordoqui, a Cuban graphic designer and former political prisoner, 
quit his job and requested an exit visa to leave Cuba. When the Cuban government opened el 
Puerto Mariel for emigration, Miguel knew that this was his opportunity to escape.29 Through 
some mutual connections, he set up a meeting with the United States Interest Section secretary 
and obtained a permit to leave for the United States. All Miguel had to do was wait for the 
government's signal. After a night out at the movies, a police officer knocked on his door and 
ordered him to be ready to leave. He hopped onto a bus to El Mosquito and transferred to a dock 
that had a yacht waiting for him and other Cubans emigrating to the United States.30  
Hopping on board the yacht, "[Miguel] looked back at the island, and [he] only saw 
lights." Cuba faded into the distance, and a realization hit Miguel: he would never be allowed to 
return to the island he called home. After a cramped and strenuous journey, emotion overcame 
Miguel and the other Cuban emigrants as they saw Key West in the distance and pictured a new 
 
28 Grenier, “The Creation and Maintenance of the Cuban American ‘Exile Ideology’,” 212-217; Jim Cullen, 
The American Dream: The Short Story of an Idea that Shaped a Nation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
Grenier theorizes the creation of the Cuban community in Miami in its migration waves: Political Exile (1959-
1964), Social Exile Migration (1965-1973), Detent Migration (1974-1979), Promised Land Migration (1981-1989), 
and Transnational Migration (1990-2000). 
29 All Spanish language words will only be italicized in their initial mention but unitalicized subsequently. 
30Miguel Ordoqui, “A Painter’s Search for Peace,” in Voices from Mariel: Oral Histories of the 1980 
Cuban Boatlift, ed. José Manuel García (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2018), 81–84. El Mosquito was a 
tent-camp used as a security checkpoint for Cubans before leaving the country to repossess any valuables left on 
their person. 
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future for themselves. "I felt free and realized what freedom tasted like; that's what I felt," 
described Miguel as he looked onward to see how kind and well-mannered the soldiers were in 
the United States in comparison to Cuban soldiers. He remembered how harshly Cuban soldiers 
treated him as a former political prisoner and understood that his emigration to the United States 
allowed him to do what he loved: painting. He lived out the rest of his life painting where he, 
alongside other Marielitos, displayed his work in shopping malls and exhibitions across Miami. 
Miguel's quick decision to apply for a visa, quit his job, and endure the harrowing journey 
through the Florida Straits changed his life forever. He became one of the thousands of migrants 
who came to Miami searching for the American Dream during an immigration movement that 
shaped the city henceforth: the Mariel Boatlift of 1980.31 
"[Those] who [have] no revolutionary genes, [those] who have no revolutionary 
blood...we do not want them, we do not need them," Fidel Castro declared to millions of Cubans 
at the Plaza de la Revoluciòn during a May Day celebration in 1980.32 Castro's speech was met 
with applause and cheers as the audience chanted "Fidel, Fidel, Fidel" to support their 
compatriot's decision to expel los gusanos from their homeland.33 The reversal of Cuba's 
restrictive emigration policy opened up the doors for 124,776 Marielitos to immigrate to the 
United States between April and September 1980.34  
 
31 Ordoqui, 84–87; José Antonio Évora, “Miguel Ordoqui: Arlequines, Mulatas, y Perseverancia,” El Nuevo 
Herald, February 2, 2005, sec. D. According to an El Nuevo Herald article featuring his work, Miguel Ordoqui 
arrived in Miami on May 9, 1980 
32 Fidel Castro, “May Day Rally” (Latin American Network Information Center (LANIC), May 1, 1980), 
Castro Speech Database, http://lanic.utexas.edu/project/castro/db/1980/19800501-1.html; Don Bohning, “Castro’s 
Angry Speech Blames Exodus on U.S.,” The Miami Herald, May 2, 1980, sec. A. May Day, or International 
Workers' Day, refers to the public celebration of laborers and workers worldwide 
33 Castro, “May Day Rally.” Los Gusanos, translated as "the worms," is the term Fidel Castro used to 
describe Cuban emigrants after the Cuban Revolution. 
34 García, Havana USA, 49–60. Marielitos was the name to describe Cuban immigrants who came to the 
United States during the Mariel Boatlift of 1980. For some Cubans, it is considered to be a derogatory term. 
Statistical data on how many Marielitos immigrated to the United States in 1980 may differ slightly depending on 
the source.  
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The 1980 Mariel Boatlift originated in the socio-cultural tensions between the exile 
community abroad and the Cuban homeland. Escaping after 1959, the Cuban community abroad 
believed their exile to be temporary and held on to the possibility of returning to Cuba one day.35 
Castro denounced the exile community and labeled them as gusanos and escoria, encouraging 
the traitors to leave the country.36 A tug-of-war battle ensued between the United States and 
Cuba, symbolizing the clash between democracy and communism. 
Tensions, however, between the exiles and Cuba had lessened since the Ford 
administration. To gain popular and diplomatic support abroad, Castro invited the exile 
community in 1978 to a dialogo on discussing issues affecting the Cuban community.37 The 
dialogo was initially accepted to open communication between the exile community and the 
Cuban government. Unfortunately, the dialogo created further divisions within the exile 
community regarding whether collaboration was possible with a government that imprisoned and 
executed so many compatriots from home.38 
Nevertheless, travel restrictions between Cuba and the United States eased as a result of 
the dialogos. The Cuban government released political prisoners and exiles had the opportunity 
to visit home for the first time since emigrating. The back-and-forth travel between the countries 
allowed Cubans who lived in the homeland to see what kind of life the exiles lived in the United 
States. Exposure to luxury and new ideas ignited fires inside Cubans who desired to leave the 
island. It was a fire that sparked two years later with the Peruvian Embassy Crisis.39  
 
35 García, 13-14. 
36 García, 16. Escoria translates as "scum." 
37 Dialogo translates as “dialogue.” 
38 García, 48-55. 
39 García; William R. Long and Guillermo Martinez, “Castro Invita al Exilio a Un Diálogo,” El Miami 
Herald, September 7, 1978. The era prior to the Mariel Boatlift is referred as the Détente where tensions between 
Cuba and the United States had eased and travel was open between the two countries. To learn more about U.S.-
Cuban relations, see Stephen G. Rabe, The Killing Zone: The United States Wages Cold War in Latin America (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
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On April 1, 1980, a Cuban bus driver crashed his minibus through the Peruvian 
embassy's gates in Havana. The driver's attempt to gain political asylum killed a Cuban guard, 
forcing Castro to withdraw his guards from the embassy to protect them from these criminals. 
Free from police protection, approximately 10,800 men, women, and children crowded the 
embassy within forty-eight hours in hopes of finding refuge. The Peruvian embassy's 
encampment received international attention as Cuban exiles rallied in support of their 
compatriots, urging the United States to intervene and rescue them. Cuba, the United Nations, 
the Organization of American States, and the Andean Pact negotiated an emigration plan set in 
motion for April 16. Across the United States, 124,776 Marielitos settled in cities far away from 
Cuba, with over 50 percent of them settling in South Florida as the Port of Mariel closed on 
September 25. The last boat arrived four days later.40 
 
40 García, Havana USA, 55–68; Portes and Stepick, City on the Edge, 23–26.Portes and Stepick outline a 
day-by-day account on the Mariel Boatlift Crisis as part of their post-1980 immigration study to South Florida; see 
Yohel Camayd Freixas, Crisis in Miami, report to the project on "Help-Seeking and Services Use Among Recent 
Latin American Refugees," conducted by the Sociology Department and School of Public Health, Johns Hopkins 

























Figure 1. Waves of Cuban Immigration to the United States from 1959 to 1980. 
Source: Portes and Bach, Latin Journey, 85. 
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Before 1980, the United States had experienced two other significant waves of Cuban 
migration: The Post-Revolution exiles 1959 to 1962 and the "Freedom Flights" of 1965 to 
1973.41 The Post-Revolution exiles comprised of political leaders tied to Fulgencio Batista's  
government and Cubans affected by Castro's social and economic reform. The "Freedom Flights" 
was an airborne operation between Cuba and the United States that allowed dissenting Cubans 
and opponents of the Castro government to leave the island. These earlier waves of Cuban 
migrations were characterized by a higher socioeconomic class and lighter skin color than those 
in the Mariel Boatlift. In contrast, Mariel exiles were typically darker skin and from working or 
lower-class backgrounds. They lacked the same privileges and opportunities that earlier waves of 
Cuban immigration had when they fled to the United States. Many Mariel exiles did not have the 
opportunity to visit the country as part of vacation trips like their wealthy counterparts. Instead, 
they based their journey on the stories told to them about what opportunities were available to 
them in the United States. 
White Cubans viewed Marielitos as a threat to the Cuban image, which had been crafted 
to praise their resilience and "model minority" characteristics that made them worthy of being 
American. Although both groups were pursuing opportunity and the American Dream, the 
established White Cubans had been in the United States longer and reaped the benefits of 
stability and positive media representation. On the other hand, Marielitos were forced to deal 
with the backlash against them for following similar desires. One Cuban American official in 
1983 commented on the effects of Mariel on the Cuban perception: "Mariel destroyed the image 
 
41 García, 1; Croucher, Imagining Miami, 106; Alejandro Portes and Robert L. Bach, Latin Journey: Cuban 
and Mexican Immigrants in the United States (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 85–86. García 
focuses primarily on the significant waves of emigration from Cuba to the United States. At the same time, 
Croucher, Portes, and Bach include the other "mini" waves in between to demonstrate the continuous timeline of 
Cuban immigration between 1959 and 1980. 
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of Cubans in the United States and, in passing, destroyed the image of Miami itself for 
tourism."42 Although this public official mentions Miami's image, he prioritizes Cuban’s image 
and exemplifies the fears and anxiety that lie in losing status and prestige. For some of these 
established White Cubans, their hold over their image was their only way to maintain and hold 
onto the American Dream they crafted within the United States. 
A local newspaper, The Miami Herald, launched a series of anti-Cuban campaigns where 
they criticized the city's massive influx of Cuban immigration, believing that they were being 
invaded and taken over. The newspaper represented the "voice of the Anglo establishment," and 
their fears were rooted in concerns over the city's economic position and threats to the power 
establishment. News stories, editorials, and letters to the editors were centered on preventing any 
future waves of immigration, and, in turn, discredit the Cuban community.43 The local anti-
Cuban sentiment corroborated with a larger national narrative in the 1980s centered on nativism 
and immigration control. Richard Lamm, a former Colorado governor, warned of the danger 
behind unassimilating immigration by citing Miami as an example of how they can “change 
America.”44  
A study of the Miami Herald found that the Mariel Boatlift’s negative coverage reached 
90 percent by May 25 and remained steadily between 40 and 60 percent after.45 Understanding 
the influence of The Miami Herald and its White-dominated allies, Cuban businessmen, leaders, 
 
42 Portes and Stepick, 21. An interview statement excerpt from Portes and Stepick panel study of Mariel 
and Haitian refugees in South Florida between 1983 and 1968 featuring government officials, entrepreneurs, and 
religious leaders. 
43 Portes and Stepick, 27–30; Roberto Fabricio, “Cuban Exiles Feel Rejected by Vote Results,” The Miami 
Herald, November 8, 1980, sec. B. 
44 Juan Gonzalez, Harvest of Empire: A History of Latinos in America (New York: Penguin Books, 2011), 
209. 
45 Juan M. Clark, José I. Lasaga, and Rose S. Reque, The 1980 Mariel Exodus: An Assessment and 
Prospect (Washington, D.C.: Council for Inter-American Security, 1981), 5; Yohel Camayd Freixas, Crisis in 
Miami, III-42; Portes and Stepick, City on the Edge, 28. 
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and entrepreneurs started to step into local politics in hopes of influencing the White 
establishments.46 Interestingly enough, the newspapers' active efforts to discredit Cubans ended 
up being one of the fires that lit up the Cuban communities to take charge within the city.  
In an attempt to differentiate themselves from the Marielitos, the established Cuban 
community banded together to take the opportunities presented to them and push forward in 
hopes of breaking through the "Anglo establishment." They pushed to reinvent the narrative 
espoused by The Miami Herald by joining local politics and, slowly but surely, taking the reins 
of power within the city by creating organizations catered to them, such as the Cuban American 
National Foundation (CANF).47 The Cuban community capitalized on their "model minority" 
status to help remind both the city and the country that they are still a product of the American 
Dream as the "Golden Exiles." Luis Botifoll, a leading Cuban American banker, embodied this 
belief by stating that "it is no exaggeration to say that the motor of [Miami's] Great Change was 
the Cuban men and women who elected freedom and came to the shores to rebuild their homes 
and face with courage an uncertain future."48 
The darker-skinned Mariel exiles pushed White Cubans to set a new course for them in 
the 1980s and onward, where they overtake the non-Latin Whites in political and other adjacent 
sectors to retain their dream and image. By becoming the establishment, they can standardize 
what it means to be Cuban American and how possible it is for Latin Americans to achieve and 
succeed in Miami. The newly arrived Cubans complicated the American Dream narrative of 
White Cubans. They needed to control their status as the “Golden Exiles,” creating a distinction 
 
46 Many Cuban businessmen and elected officials were unknown to Miami's non-Latin Whites at the time. 
They were disregarded for speaking Spanish and interest in Cuban politics, specifically on updates on Castro's 
government. See Alejandro Portes' "The Rise of Ethnicity: Determinants of Ethnic Perceptions Among Cuban Exiles 
in Miami, " American Sociological Review 39, no. 3 (1984) for more information on tensions between non-Latin 
Whites and White Cuban Elites. 
47 Portes and Stepick, City on the Edge, 35. 
48 Portes and Stepick, 36; Luis J. Botifoll, Introducción al Future de Miami (Miami: Laurenty, 1988), 3, 10. 
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between them and darker-skinned Cubans. White Cubans longer were comfortable with being 
the minority, but instead, they pushed to become a majority – a reality that would not come about 
until they seized power in the 1990s. 
 
Cubans, the New Colonizers? 
  In May 1986, the launch of Mario Ernesto Sanchez's Festival of Hispanic Theatre was 
marked by controversy, protests, and bomb threats.49 Dolores Prida's one-act play, Coser y 
Cantar, was slated to be performed in a three-bill showing but was forced to cancel after intense 
scrutiny and violence by Cuban exiles in Miami. They denounced Prida for her participation in 
Castro's dialogos and her belief in normalizing relations with Cuba, arguing her political 
sympathies aligned with communism. However, the play in question had little to do with Castro 
or Cuba – it was a bilingual comedy about a Latina woman caught between her "Spanish" and 
"American" self. Prida, a New York-based playwright, denied all accusations of communist 
sympathies and retaliated: "I'm one of the top Hispanic playwrights in this country, and that 
recognition is everywhere except Miami."50 
Prida's nation-wide recognition was no use to the Cuban opinion that decried her as an 
"enemy of the Cuban exiles."51 She was an outsider exposed to Miami politics, where anti-
communist Cuban sentiment permeated the city's culture. Although Prida identified as a Cuban 
American, her perceived political affiliations with Castro overpowered any potential camaraderie 
amongst Cubans and further ostracized her. While Pride may not have been a communist, she 
 
49 Jordan Levin, “Pioneers in Arts,” The Miami Herald, September 13, 2015, sec. AA. Teatro Avante 
initially produced the Festival of Hispanic Theatre. Sanchez's festival and theatre company would later expand as 
the International Festival of Hispanic Theatre by Teatro Nuevo. See the University of Miami's Cuban Theater 
Digital Archive for additional background information on Sanchez's festival. 
50 “Playwright Vows to Attend Hispanic Theater Festival,” The Orlando Sentinel, May 2, 1986, sec. B; Jon 
Nordheimer, “Tempest in Miami Over a Playwright,” The New York Times, May 10, 1986, sec. 1 
51 Nordheimer, “Tempest in Miami Over a Playwright.” 
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was perceived by the Cuban public to be one because she was not adamantly anti-Castro. 
Established White Cubans have created a strict binary to dictate what is permissible in Miami. 
Prida’s incident, however, did not exist in isolation as the anti-communist atmosphere continued 
to prevail and prompted Americas Watch to release a report in 1992, entitled “Dangerous 
Dialogue: Attacks on Freedom of Expression in Miami’s Cuban Exile Community.”52 Her status 
as a Cuban American was overseen by the belief that she was willing to cooperate with Castro 
deemed unforgivable and uncooperative by the White Cuban establishment. The city's perceived 
values affected her ability to produce work in Miami, restricting her access to the city's 
opportunities.   
Columnists in The Miami Herald criticized the excessive protests and argued that the 
cancellation of Prida's work was an act of censorship.53 Spanish-language radio criticized her, 
demanded counter-protests, and used intimidation tactics to scare her, forcing Prida to be 
escorted by police and security around the city. A Cuban businessman held up his position by 
defending the criticism: 
When so many persons have been affected by communism, when so many had to 
abandon the land they were born, when people could not visit the cemeteries where their 
loved one’s rest, we do have to protect this kind of thing. Why not? Why do they have to 
impose on such a painful thing? A person who has not suffered, who has not had relatives 
killed, can say coolly that there must be a freedom of expression. We know better. It is 
too hard that they come here, to our center, to tell us these things.54 
 
In establishing control over the city, Miami's Cuban community ensured that their identity was 
protected and respected by pushing away any ounce of communist sympathy, even if it had to 
resort to threats and violence. The extreme perspective is justified in arguing that their 
 
52 Croucher, Miami in the 1990s, 227. 
53 Raphael de Acha, “Foes of Prida’s Play Cast the First Stone,” The Miami Herald, June 15, 1986, sec. A. 
54 Portes and Stepick, City on the Edge, 138. Field interview conducted on January 16, 1986, by Portes and 
Stepick. 
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experiences should not be reimagined in a new light and discredit dissenters. Prida's controversy 
epitomized Cuban’s power and their commitment to ensuring that situations portrayed their 
community in a light that benefited them. It did not matter whether someone identified as a 
communist or not – if it was rationalized and framed as such, it needed to be pushed back on and 
rejected. Within two years, a pipe-bomb was detonated at the Cuban Museum of Arts and 
Culture entrance, where it was having an auction on works associated with Fidel Castro – 
repeating a cycle of pushback and intimidation by Cuban exiles.55 
Some White Cubans may perceive communist sympathies to infringe on their 
opportunities and standards, or rather their Cubanized American Dream. The White Cuban 
community’s attempts to reimagine Cuba for themselves in Miami was based on expelling any 
remnants or legacies of the ideologies that pushed them out of Cuba in the first place. Alongside 
an anti-communist stance, another tenet of the Cubanized American Dream is the pursuit of 
capitalistic success. For many Cubans, success is synonymous with opportunity and freedom. 
José Caballero captures this sentiment by stating that “freedom has a price”: for him, it was 
letting go of Cuba in pursuit of freedom in the United States where they can go change careers, 
open a business, and become wealthy based on their own will and determination.56 Alongside the 
abstraction of success and opportunity, racial perceptions play into the American Dream by 
feeding into a larger question about who fits into the narrative. Arguably, the Cubanized 
American Dream is also centered on its proximity to Whiteness, or at least the U.S. racial 
construction of it. Subsequent immigrant groups, including the Mariel exiles, must adhere to 
these tenets or be marginalized in Miami. Ultimately, their perception of opportunity maintains 
 
55 Jon Nordheimer, “Arts Exhibit Dispute Splits Miami Cubans,” The New York Times, May 18, 1988, sec. 
A. 
56 José Caballero and Elizabeth Caballero, “Freedom Has a Price,” in Voices from Mariel: Oral Histories of 
the 1980 Cuban Boatlift, ed. José Manuel García, (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2018), 80 
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its strength in Miami, pushing and imposing on other groups to assimilate and follow similar 
paths. 
Before the first Cuban immigration wave in 1959 after Batista's fall, Miami neared 
500,000 residents, with about 83% constituted as "White, non-Hispanic" while "Hispanic" only 
made up about 4% of the population.57 At the time, the White population maintained social and 
political dominance within the city with little awareness of how drastically the population would 
change in the next couple of decades. Between 1950 and 1980, during the significant Cuban 
immigration waves, there was a 1395% increase in the city's Hispanic makeup. As the Hispanic 
population increased, the “White non-Hispanic” population decreased in an “Anglo Flight” to 
evade the Cuban takeover. The inverted demographical relationship is exhibited by how 
enrollment by ethnicity drastically changed in Miami-Dade Public Schools, where Hispanic 
enrollment increased by 60.4% and “White non-Hispanic” decreased by 42.7% between 1975 
and 1988.58 The massive increase in the overall Hispanic population demonstrates a sizable shift 
from White to a non-White majority, raising questions on how the city would react to its 
newcomers. Cuban exiles constituted 70% of the newly arrived "Hispanic" population, while the 
remaining 30% was made up of other Latin American immigrant groups, particularly 
Nicaraguans and Haitians.  
Established White Cubans needed to catapult themselves into power within the city to 
ensure their survival and prevent any more damage to their perceived exceptionalism as the 
 
57 Portes and Stepick, City on the Edge, 211. Portes and Stepick, City on the Edge, 211. According to the 
Ethnic Composition of Metropolitan Miami table, the total Miami population in 1950 was 495,000 with 410,000, 
White, non-Hispanics, and 20,000 Hispanics as well as 65,000 Black. It is critical to note that there is overlap 
between the Hispanic and Black categorization due to Afro-Latinx/Black Hispanics. 
58 Lisandro Pérez, “The 1990s: Cuban Miami at the Crossroads,” Cuban Studies 20 (1990): 3-9 
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"Golden Exiles."59 They ousted the previous power, the non-Latin Whites, and set the city's tone 
henceforth. The Cubanization of Miami dictated the feasibility of opportunity in the city and 
whether other groups had access to such opportunities. They standardized expectations for 
communist exiles, mainly from Cuba, and reinforced a push for capitalistic success and an anti-
communist stance.  
By 1990, the Latin American and Caribbean portion of Miami’s population reached 
1,061,669. The Cuban population made up over 50% of that number and 49.2% of the city's total 
population, demonstrating the evident strength of Cubans' numbers in the city.60 Initially, the 
Cuban exodus in the 1960s was perceived as a "temporary visit," hoping that Castro's 
government would end by a revolution supported by the United States. This dream never came to 
fruition. Cubans needed to find ways to accommodate themselves in a city that was not home. 
The dream they recreated was centered in Miami, where the rapid increase in the Cuban 
population enabled the community to recreate la Cuba de ayer. 61 As David Rieff in The New 
Yorker explains: "In Miami, Cubans live, or try to live, in la Cuba de ayer – the Cuba of 
yesterday. It is a mythical country we have fabricated, where nostalgia and myths abound."62 For 
many of these Cubans, their country was lost to communism, and so reinventing it by taking their 
culture and traditions enabled them to reimagine a world where they can thrive and succeed. 
Their American Dream was essentially rooted in reclaiming a past world and solidifying a road 
for future generations. And thus, opportunity and success are filtered through a Cuban lens that 
favors their community over the others to help rebuild a quasi-Cuban homeland. 
 
59 García, Havana USA, 108-111. "The Golden Exiles" refers to the Cubans that came after the fall of 
Batista in 1959 and before the Mariel Boatlift in 1980. This identity marker and status worked in tandem with the 
"Cuban Success Story" in praising the achievements of Cuban in fleeing Castro's communist government. 
60 Elizabeth M. Aranda, Sallie Hughes, and Elena Sabogal, Making a Life in Multiethnic Miami: 
Immigration and the Rise of a Global City (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2014), 24–25. 
61 Croucher, Imagining Miami, 119; García, Havana USA, 84. 
62 David Rieff, “The Second Havana,” The New Yorker, May 18, 1987, 73. 
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Although Cubans were not uncommon in Miami before the era of mass migrations, given 
the occasional tourist visits, their permanent presence raised concerns for both White and Black 
Americans during the 1980s, believing that Cubans were trying to take over the city. Cubans 
were thought to be rising labor competitors in both service and professional work. Recently 
arrived immigrants were willing to work low-paying jobs in the informal sector. In contrast, 
established immigrants sought ways to receive business licenses and run for public office. The 
city's non-Latin White dominance was threatened by a White Cuban population unwilling to 
remain idle in a city that did not initially cater to their interests.  
White Cuban success has additionally maintained through their election into high-profile 
positions and offices that allowed them to push for policies that fit their community's best 
interest. Since 1996, the winning mayoral candidates for either Miami-Dade County or the City 
of Miami have been White Cubans. Interestingly enough, all of the "winners" of the Mayoral 
elections have been White Cuban men who immigrated to Miami after Batista's fall between 
1959 and 1962.63 The cycle began with Xavier Suarez in 1985 and was followed by Willy Gort 
as the Mayor of the City of Miami and Alex Penales as the Mayor of Miami-Dade County in 
1996.64 There has been little (almost no) opposition from other national groups during each 
election year, even though Miami's first Latino mayor was Puerto Rican-born Maurice Ferré in 
1973.65 
In recent years, the established White Cubans' children have followed their parents' 
footsteps by pursuing the exact positions that their parents ran for before. This phenomenon can 
 
63 The position titles for both the City of Miami and Miami-Dade County are referred to as "Mayor," with 
the former's jurisdiction centered on the downtown area. Simultaneously, the latter has jurisdiction over the entire 
metropolitan area in which the City of Miami resides. 
64 The only era in which the City of Miami did not have either a Cuban or Cuban American Mayor after 
Xavier Suarez's initial inauguration in 1985 was when Stephen T. Clark succeed him in 1993. 
65 Maurice Ferré served six terms as the Mayor of the City of Miami after stepping in for David T. Kennedy 
in 1973, who was caught in a bribery controversy and asked to step down. 
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be seen with Francis X. Suarez running for Mayor of the City of Miami in 2017 and Raquel 
Regalado running in 2016 for the Miami-Dade County.66 Established Cubans have taken hold of 
a prominent public office and retained a generational strength that deters and deflects other 
groups from running for public office. In reevaluating the national origins and ethnicity of Miami 
elected officials in 2010, Cuban or Cuban Americans made up 40.9% of the elected officials 
while Non-Cuban Hispanics only made up about 4% of the elected officials.67 Even if a 
candidate from another nationality or race ran for office, the chance of them winning the election 
was slim because of the Cuban voting bloc. Cubans want to align with Cubans who match their 
interests, as long as there is an anti-communist foundation.  
For many Latin Americans, including Mariel Cubans, their reasonings behind 
immigrating to the United States were rooted in economics, employment, and education.68 They 
left their home country based on the perception that they could pursue their dreams and find jobs. 
Carlos de la Arena, a Marielito, encapsulates this in his newfound love for the United States after 
leaving Cuba: "I have worked in many places since I arrived, but the nice thing about this 
country is that if you work, you can have things. I had to leave Cuba because I was suffocating 
there. A human being who cherishes values such as friendship, freedom, and love for nature 
cannot live on that island."69 Although a Mariel exile, Arena still emphasizes the desire to pursue 
opportunities denied in Cuba and putting those issues to the forefront when it comes to local 
politics as employment and opportunity are vital to him alongside others. 
 
66 Francis X. Suarez is the son of Xavier Suarez, initially elected in 1985 and 1997, and Raquel Regalado is 
the daughter of Tomás Regalado, initially elected in 2009. 
67 Aranda, Hughes, and Sabogal, Making a Life in Multiethnic Miami, 169. 
68 Aranda, Hughes, and Sabogal, 58. The survey data is based on Arranda, Hughes, and Sabogal's interview 
and survey results where they research transnational immigrants with a focus on Latin American immigrants in 
South Florida Post-1986. See their grant, research, and abstract information on the National Science Foundation's 
Entry on Arranda, Hughes, and Sabogal's "Immigrant Transnationalism and Modes of Incorporation." 
69 Carlos de la Arena, “A Believer in Miracles,” in Voices from Mariel: Oral Histories of the 1980 Cuban 
Boatlift, ed. José Manuel García (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2018), 47. 
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Despite The Miami Herald’s efforts to discredit Cuban success early on, the newspaper 
ultimately and ironically had to accommodate and bend to the Cuban majority by scaling back its 
malicious attacks and re-introducing its Spanish newspaper in 1987: El Nuevo Herald. The shift 
from attacking to accommodating demonstrates the White Cuban community's influence on 
Miami, where they were no longer standing on the sidelines and letting their opportunities. They 
shaped institutions that had actively worked against them to help themselves and expand their 
prospect. A Spanish newspaper enabled Spanish-speaking journalists, writers, and thinkers to 
express their opinion in a common language. For some, the ability to express views that the 
government did not censor them to pursue authorial opportunities and frame stories in a model 
that fit the "Cuban Success Story.”70 Cubans as a model minority through the Cuban Success 
Story are a symptom of the American Dream where capitalistic success, anti-communist 
sentiment, and Whiteness is placed at the center. 
Cubans forged a path for themselves in Miami to remain on top and dictate the 
opportunities for their nationality and community. They created a network within Miami that 
both established and recently-arrived immigrants could tap into and use to their advantage 
because of the path laid out to them since the 1960s. Before 1980, White Americans praised 
Cubans in the United States for their resilience against communism and choosing to flee their 
country.71 A classic rags-to-riches myth was created about Cubans and propagated heavily 
throughout the United States to showcase the opportunities of the United States. The story was 
used to validate the American Dream possibilities, and their struggles are only part of their past. 
They became the blueprint for what is expected and possible within the United States, especially 
 
70 George Gilder, “Miami’s Cuban Miracle,” Reason, November 1984. “No other immigrant group so 
inundated a city, and transformed it so quickly and successfully, while achieving such multifarious business 
breakthroughs as the nearly 600,000 fugitives from Castro's government who made Miami their home after 1960.” 
71 García, Havana USA, 110. 
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for Latin American immigrants. The "Cuban Success Story" was a tool used by White Cubans to 
highlight the strength and potentials of capitalism to discredit Cuba and communist amid the 
Cold War. Despite fears, the “Golden Exile" trope did not end with the 1980 Mariel Boatlift 
Crisis; but instead, the legacy used and left in place by established White Cubans was in ways 
imposed on the “other” Latin American groups. They were expected to perform and follow 
similar patterns as the Cubans had done so decades earlier. The pressures of the “Golden Exile” 
were no longer attributed to one sole group, but the expectation to be an anti-communist patriot 
and capitalistic success was imposed onto the newly-arrived Latin American immigrants  
By reinventing the American Dream, White Cubans were no longer foreigners within the 
land and expected to fit into the model of United States assimilation. Instead, they were in a city 
that belonged to them. The "Cubanized American Dream" is based on a mixture between 
Americanism and Cubanism. Both ideologies work in tandem to become a beacon of hope and a 
model for future generations of Latin American immigrants. They go beyond merely being 
ambassadors for the United States, and their status and model example as the "Golden Exiles" 
lives on, especially within Miami.  
 
The "Other" Latin Americans  
"Today, the 6th of December, we Venezuelans have written a new page in our history. 
The national soul has been reborn," announced Hugo Chávez after winning Venezuela's 1998 
presidential elections.72 His victory sparked joy throughout Caracas as supporters chanted his 
name, set off firecrackers, and celebrated a new era for the country.73 Chavez, representing the 
Fifth Republic Movement, ran on a socialist platform based on anti-poverty, anti-corruption, and 
 
72 Tim Johnson, “Chavez Wins in Venezuela,” December 7, 1998, 84 edition. 
73 Chardy, “Wealthy Latin Americans Immigrants Seek Refuge in South Florida.” 
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most importantly, anti-capitalist. The economic policies enacted, and promised, by Chavez 
brought about concern amongst upper and middle-class Venezuelans, fearing the changes on the 
country’s horizon. Patricia Andrade, the Venezuelan founder of Raíces Venezolanas, reflected: 
“I’ve been living in this country for over 30 years, and once Chavez came to power, I knew 
something bad was going to happen in Venezuela.”74  
During the late 1990s, about 150,000 Venezuelans followed the previous U.S. immigrant 
waves’ footsteps and sought refuge in South Florida; however, they were not alone in their 
journey. Latin Americans across the region, predominantly from South America, fled their home 
countries and settled in the United States in hopes of redefining opportunities for themselves. An 
estimated 25,000 to 50,000 immigrants from Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela 
settled in South Florida between 1999 and 2000. A senior Clinton administration official said: 
“[The immigration] is not out of the ordinary given some of the economic and social turmoil that 
these countries are experiencing.”75  
During the early 2000s, the rise of socialist governments, political turmoil, and economic 
instability prompted middle and upper-class professionals to resettle and reinvest in a new future 
in the United States.76 Like the Cuban exodus in the mid-twentieth century, these "new" Latin 
American immigrant groups began to slowly change Miami's cultural, economic, and political 
landscape yet failed to break through the White Cuban establishment.77 However, the city was 
not the same as it once was in the 1960s. Miami was no longer a White Anglo majority, but 
instead, it was a city dominated by White Cubans – a city that resembled la Cuba de ayer. The 
 
74 The Right-Wing Latinos of Miami: Proud Boys and Refugees, directed by Justin Green, aired August 2, 
2019 (New York: Vice Media Group, 2019). Raices Venezolonas, or Venezuelan Roots, is an awareness and support 
program for Venezuelan immigrants founded in 2016.   
75 Chardy, “Wealthy Latin Americans Seek Refuge in South Florida.” 
76 Fabiola Santiago, “Mexicans Finding Rich Lives in Miami,” The Miami Herald, May 5, 2005. 
77 For example, South American immigration rose from 1,035,062 in 1990 to 1,353,562 in 2000 – an 
estimated 31% increase within a decade, according to the U.S. Census in 1990 and 2000. 
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rise in non-Cuban Latin Americans to Miami posed a threat to Cuban dominance as new groups 
were forced to be included in the city’s complex intraethnic and ethnoracial tension. The city was 
no longer forced to handle one nationality of Latin America but a multitude.  
 The new, or rather the “other,” Latin American groups believed in the opportunities 
available in the United States – opportunities made available under the American Dream 
mythology. They left their home countries hoping that the United States could provide them a 
future tied to economic success and opportunity. For instance, Jorge, an immigrant from Perú, 
considers himself an “economic immigrant” where his desire to relocate to the United States was 
primarily to better his living standard.78 Peruvian immigration to the United States came in three 
waves, similar to the Cubans, during the 1950s, 1970s, and recently the 1990s when 63% of 
Peruvian immigrants arrived in the United States.79 Although Jorge explicitly mentions the 
American Dream, his desire to improve his life was centered on economic opportunity and 
aligned with the tenets of success associated with the American Dream – a definition explored by 
Jennifer Hochschild.80 As a Peruvian, however, Jorge lacks the same type of extensive network 
that Cubans have after living in the United States, specifically in Miami, for over 50 years.81 
Together with governmental economic and social support, these networks enable an ease in 
 
78 Elena Sabogal, “Viviendo En La Sombra: The Immigration of Peruvian Professionals to South Florida,” 
Latino Studies 3, no. 1 (2005): 118. “I can say that I am an economic immigrant. The country [Peru] does not give 
me the opportunities to achieve what I want.”  
79 Sabogal, “Viviendo En La Sombra: The Immigration of Peruvian Professionals to South Florida,” 117. 
The increase in Peruvian immigrants can be witnessed in the population increasing 42% in Miami-Dade County and 
150% in Broward County. See Teófilo Altamirano, Los que se fueron: Peruanos en Estados Unidos (Lima: 
Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 1992), for the history and context behind Peruvian immigration to the 
United States. 
80 Jennifer Hochschild, “What is the American Dream?”, in Race, Class, and the Soul of the Nation 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 17. 
81 Sabogal, “Viviendo En La Sombra: The Immigration of Peruvian Professionals to South Florida,” 117; 
Portes and Stepick, City on the Edge. 
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transition from an immigrant’s home country to the United States as they can take advantage of 
the opportunities established for them. 
 Miguel, a retired Chilean professional, immigrated to Miami in 1980 with his wife in 
hopes of establishing a family and career in medicine – opportunities that were unattainable for 
him under Augusto Pinochet’s dictatorship.82 He was amazed by the available options within the 
United States, claiming that “everyone had a chance for success in this country.” Miguel 
indicated that the American Dream was possible and real, but it was contingent on whether 
people had the determination and willingness to pursue it. He described how the city had 
transformed itself from “an empty lot” to “towers and skyscrapers,” especially with the massive 
influx of Latin American immigrants helping develop the city.83 
 Although Miguel did not flee a socialist state like other immigrants, he still believed that 
Chile’s political climate and economic status would hinder him from going further in the medical 
field. Miguel’s decision to leave the country and settle in Miami demonstrates his desire to 
improve his standard of living and pursue opportunities under the auspices of American success. 
New immigrant groups understood the limits of opportunities in their home countries and 
pursued the American Dream for a chance at a middle-class existence, akin to the White Cubans. 
Their opportunities, or rather dreams, were rooted in securing success linked with wealth and 
employment, specifically in the United States.  
The American Dream, an ethos based on mythologized success, has been pursued by 
groups in the past, such as Cubans, as a way to reject their socialist home countries and embrace 
 
82 Augusto Pinochet deposed the Popular Unity government of Salvador Allende on September 11, 1973. 
The Chilean coup established Pinochet’s Government Junta that served as the executive and legislative body until 
1990 when the country transitioned to democracy. 
83 “Miguel”, interview and translation by author, phone call, October 2020. All interview names have been 
changed to preserve the anonymity of the interviewee’s responses.  
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democracy. The “Cubanized American Dream" was rooted in anti-communist sentiment, 
capitalist work ethic, U.S. patriotism, and Whiteness. It is an expected model of success imposed 
on Latin American immigrants by the United States and perpetuated by White Cubans. Latin 
American immigrants in the late 1990s onward were expected to follow a reimagined national 
ethos based on the Cuban Success story. 
The “new” Latin American immigrants followed similar immigrant patterns as their 
Cuban predecessors in the 1960s by relocating to South Florida in pursuit of an economic 
opportunity that had been taken from their home country. Their assumptions and rejection of 
socialist or “communist” ideologies aligned with the everlasting effect of Cold War politics that 
had a firm hold on Miami, specifically Cuban culture. Many of these groups, similar to Cubans, 
would become staunch anti-communist ambassadors for the United States as they bought into the 
“American Dream” reinforced by the Cubans. Eduardo Gamara, a professor at Florida 
International University, draws a connection between newly arrived Latin American immigrants 
from socialist countries and their association with U.S. Republican party politics:  
Miami is a very particular place because the immigration that comes here. These are 
immigrants that come by plane, and a lot of immigrants that come here come from a 
higher socioeconomic standard. You will see most that most of them back home, they 
were conservatives that believed in that market and who were obviously against the 
[socialist] policies so it’s not surprising that they would readily identify with the right.84 
 
By extension, the American Dream is a symptom of Cold War politics embedded into Latin 
American cultures, specifically Cubans, that is acted upon when they relocate to the United 
States. They idealize the nation as a beacon for democracy, and capitalism by default, that they 
become actors in the “macro” manifested in the “micro”; in this case, the ideological battle 
against communism was exhibited through the lives of Latin Americans. 
 
84 The Right-Wing Latinos of Miami: Proud Boys and Refugees, directed by Justin Green. 
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The United States Census Bureau reported a steady increase in Miami's Cubans from 
1990 to 2012. They continued to be the majority of Latinos within the city, with 561,868 in 
1990, 650,601 in 2000, and 894,168 in 2012.85 With that being said, statistics offer another 
insight into which Latin American immigrants were even more quickly rising in numbers within 
the city. Between 1990 and 2012, Miami's top nationalities, excluding Cubans, shifted every 
decade between Nicaraguans, Haitians, and Colombians.86 They maintained a high presence 
within the city as political and economic shifts in their home countries pushed more people to 
immigrate to South Florida. Although Cubans hold a majority, the percentage change has been 
rapidly increasing for other Latin American groups over the decades. For instance, Venezuelans 
experienced a 122 percent increase, Uruguayans a 251 percent increase, and El Salvadorians a 
132 percent increase between 2000 and 2012 compared to Cubans' 39 percent increase.87 
The demographic changes indicate that "new" Latin American groups moved to Miami 
faster than Cubans, posing a possible future threat to the city's Cuban majority. Before the 2000s, 
an article by Carlos Harrison in The Miami Herald echoed this concern early on by stating: "The 
political pie keeps growing for Hispanics, and it's getting sliced into more pieces. Cubans still 
have the biggest piece, but it's shrinking."88 Suppose different non-Cuban immigrant groups 
begin to settle in Miami. It can create ripple effect changes within the city that can transform the 
city from being "Cubanized" to being "Latinized," encompassing more nationalities versus one. 
The expansion of the "pie," as Harrison put it, opens up the opportunity and breaks through the 
 
85 Aranda, Hughes, and Sabogal, Making a Life in Multiethnic Miami, 25. 
86 Aranda, Hughes, and Sabogal, 25. The additional "Other Hispanic" category in 2000 was considered 
technically to be a majority non-Cuban Latin American group based on statistical data, but the information does not 
clarify who is classified as "Other Hispanic." This categorization may refer to other countries in Latin America with 
varying colonial histories, such as French Guiana and Belize. 
87 Aranda, Hughes, and Sabogal, 24-25. 
88 Carlos Harrison, “South Florida Growing More Latin, but Less Cuban,” Miami Herald, September 13, 
1988, sec. B. 
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model that places pressure on Latin American immigrants to assimilate and perform as the 
Cubans did in the past. On the converse, if the “pie” is being taken away for Cubans, what does 
that mean for them? How do their model of success and their American Dream change in relation 
to the influx of the “other” Latin Americans in the city? 
 
Nicaraguans and Haitians: A Refugee Encore  
In recent decades, Nicaraguans and Haitians trail behind Cubans as the largest Latin 
American groups in the city, raising questions about how they may perceive themselves with 
respect to Cubans and the United States. Both groups followed similar immigration patterns 
between the late 1970s and early 1990s to re-establish themselves within the city. Like the 
Cubans’ development of Little Havana, Nicaraguans and Haitians created their enclaves in the 
city where thousands of family and friends flocked to Little Managua and Little Haiti. 
In 1988, thousands of Nicaraguans immigrants settled in Miami-Dade County, where 
U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) estimated a rate of three hundred 
Nicaraguans arriving per week.89 As INS detained some of them at the Texas-Mexico border, an 
eerie resemblance and comparison were drawn to the detained Mariel refugees of 1980. A 
federal judge ruled their release and the city prepared for a “repeated performance” of survival 
and tension.90 Working-class Nicaraguans revitalized the informal sector as they sold flowers on 
the streets and worked cleaning jobs while upper and middle-class Nicaraguans settled in 
wealthier areas and reestablished their professional careers. Each of them worked toward a 
 
89 Christopher Marquis, “Miami Grapples with Influx of Nicaraguans,” The Miami Herald, December 15, 
1988, sec. 1A. 
90 Portes and Stepick, City on the Edge, 150 – 151; Christopher Marquis and Frank Cerabino, “Dade on 
Edge over Nicaraguans,” The Miami Herald, January 14, 1989, sec. 1A. The migration from Texas to Miami was 
based on a federal judge’s order that lifted the immigrants' restriction to settle near the Mexican border. Many 
Nicaraguan exiles took the opportunity to travel over 1,000 miles to Miami where many of them had relatives and 
heard stories about accommodations in large stadiums.  
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chance at the “pie” being offered to them by living in Miami. Thousands of Nicaraguans were 
following the footsteps of their immigrant predecessors and “pinned their hopes for a future on a 
new life in Miami.”91  
Despite repressive and somewhat contradictory U.S. immigration policies, Cubans and 
Cuban Americans, many of whom were in positions of power, embraced Nicaraguans with open 
arms.92 A campaign promoted by Cubans was created to help out Nicaraguans in their time of 
crisis. Doctors set up examination rooms, city aids called up restaurants to pledge food 
donations, news directors raised funds on their shows, and workers attempted to find job 
postings. Cesar Odio, a Cuban manager, bused 150 refugees to the Bobby Maduro stadium and 
assured reporters that they would be treated the same as the Marielitos in 1980: “Now they 
understand that they have the full support of the city.”93 Nicaraguans were viewed by Cubans as 
victims of communism and referred to as “our Nicaraguan brothers” in reaction to Castro and the 
Sandinistas' comradery. 
The shared plight between Nicaraguans and Cubans allowed the two groups to bond over 
their shared past to reject the government from their home countries respectively and pursue an 
opportunity in the United States. In sharing that commonality, Nicaraguans were able to 
indirectly tap into the extensive Cuban network that had been established over time. The Cuban 
campaign to support Nicaraguan refugees demonstrates the massive social and cultural capital 
that Cubans had in Miami – a feat that would have been not possible years prior. Nicaraguans fit 
 
91 Croucher, Imagining Miami, 77; Raymond A. Mohl, “On the Edge: Blacks and Hispanics in 
Metropolitan Miami since 1959,” Florida Historical Quarterly 69 (1990), 37 – 56. 
92 Portes and Stepick, City on the Edge, 156-161,163-164. Nicaraguans struggled in receiving federal policy 
support where it was vague enough that deportation was halted temporarily and were allowed to stay in Miami, yet 
they were still encouraged to go back and stay in Nicaragua to fight the Sandinistas.  
93 Portes and Stepick. Odio’s comment on embracing the Nicaraguans similarly to the Marielitos is ironic 
because the Cubans in the 1980s pushed to distance themselves and protect their images as the “Golden Exiles.” On 
the contrary, the Cuban community did not initially support the Marielitos because they were perceived as 
“criminals” and “unfit” for Miami’s society. 
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the "Cuban success story" model, and, to an extent, the “Cubanized American Dream” in their 
effort to reject socialist and communist governments. They were able to conform and meet some 
of the "Golden Exile" expectations by representing another compatriot willing to uphold 
Americanism on the international front. 
Compared to Nicaraguans, Haitian immigrant groups differed in their migration patterns 
to the United States and how they were accepted and perceived by the United States. Haitian 
immigrant waves to the United States emerged during the Duvalier dynasty in the 1970s and 
1980s to find opportunities yet found themselves in similar boats as the Black community under 
"double subordination” where their identity operated in a liminal space between being Black and 
being a Caribbean immigrant.94 Like the Chilean immigrants in the 1980s, Haitians differed 
because they were not escaping a communist government, but rather an autocratic dictatorship. 
INS attempted to discourage Haitians from declaring political asylum and accelerated the 
deportation process. They justified it by arguing that there was a difference between “political” 
refugees and “economic” refugees, with the former referring to escaping communist 
government.95  
While the Haitians eventually received some support, the difference in how Haitians were 
received compared to how other more contemporary groups, such as Cubans and Nicaraguans, 
were received exhibits a jarring disparity in opportunity and success in Miami. While Haitians 
were attempting to, as with many others, find their American Dream, the U.S. government 
curtailed them from doing so by creating a distinction between “political” and “economic” 
motivations. However, the American way of success is inherently rooted in economics, 
specifically how it embraces capitalism and rejects communism. By ideologically codifying the 
 
94 Portes and Stepick, 50-52. 
95 Portes and Stepick, 53. 
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opportunity, success, and the American Dream, a standard is created to pursue opportunity in the 
United States and who is left out of that narrative, specifically how these tenets espoused by the 
White Cuban establishment contradicts the existence of Black immigrants like Haitians. 
Although Nicaraguans’ and Haitians' presence may have possibly threatened Cuban 
dominance early on, Cubans still maintain the majority of the city’s Latin American population 
compared to the 113,501 Nicaraguans and 123,001 Haitians in 2012.96 Based on numbers, 
Nicaraguans and Haitians, even combined, fail to surpass even 50% percent Miami’s Cuban 
population. Both of these groups may lack the expansive network that the Cuban community has 
established over the years within the city, preventing them from accessing the same 
opportunities. Nicaraguans had been socialized to be part of a more extensive American 
ambassadorship network rooted in tenets similar to the ones that White Cubans have followed. 
On the other hand, Haitians had similar motives in immigrating to the United States, but 
the context of their plight varied substantially. While they were escaping an authoritarian 
government, Haitians' rallying support did not include an invitation to the ambassadorship nor 
welcomed into the American as it had been for the Cubans and Nicaraguans. In some ways, 
similar to the Mariel Cubans, Haitians were expected to compete for the other groups in the city 
and contribute to the intraethnic tension in fighting for their opportunity and success as both 
were racialized differently compared to White Cubans. Their chances of opportunity were 
reduced because they failed to meet the criteria that offered them the chance to be part of the 
American Dream prophesized and laid out for White Cubans. Ultimately, the difference and 
similarities between both groups highlight the conflicts that come with perception, especially in 
relation to how a group can achieve their American Dream and what factors hinder or enable it. 
 
96 Aranda, Hughes, and Sabogal, Making a Life in Multiethnic Miami, 23. 
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Latinx Americans and Immigrant Possibilities  
 In 2004 and 2007, two national surveys focusing on the American Dream were conducted 
by the National League of Cities (NLC) and Lake Research Partners (LRP).97 The survey 
unveiled a commonality found amongst the responses of working-class Americans and Latin 
American immigrants: “Financial stability.” While both groups may differ in racial and ethnic 
background, social class and the future perception are contingent on whether an individual has 
financial security. For many non-Cuban Latin American immigrants, they feel similar pressures 
as other groups and perceive that the achievability of the American Dream is based on whether 
employment is available for them that will allow them to continue to be prosperous – an 
opportunity that may not be granted to them in their home countries. 
Additionally, data from the Immigrant Transnationalism and Modes of Incorporation 
(ITMI) survey showcases the different causes of immigrating to the United States in general and 
specifically among Latin American immigrants.98 The survey emphasizes how economics, job 
opportunity, and education were the top three reasons immigrants moved to the United States. 
Although appearing dissimilar, the three reasons are connected: they allow immigrants to 
achieve cultural capital within Miami and climb up the social and economic ladder. They 
contribute to the economic stability and possibility of the American Dream and, thus, work in 
tandem with a national ethos that continues to hold a presence in Latin American immigrants' 
lives. It reinforces that education and job opportunities will contribute to a newfound success that 
would not be found in their home countries.  
 
97 Luis Ricardo Fraga et al., “Trying for the Americano Dream: Barriers to Making the United States 
‘Home’,” in Latino Lives in America. (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2010), 29-32. 
98 Arranda, Hughes, and Sabogal, Making a Life in Multiethnic Miami, 58. 
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Americanism’s ideologies can be transferred from one generation to the next, exhibiting 
its potency and omnipresence within family structures. The children of Latin American 
immigrants experience the American Dream's omnipresence in their daily lives as they attempt to 
decipher their perceptions of opportunities in a city filled with competing ideas of success. 
Alejandro, a White Chilean and Venezuelan American student, commented on how he believed 
that his ‘American Dream’ is an extension of his parents’ dreams. He discusses how his family 
immigrated to the United States in hopes of giving their children the opportunities that were 
stripped from them: “I wouldn’t have had it [the ‘American Dream’] if they didn’t chase theirs,” 
said Alejandro, “and I feel like a for a lot of like first- and second-generation 
people...that’s...that’s the pressure, you know? How do I honor what I have been given?”99 
Alejandro explores ideas of what it means to continue the legacies of opportunities and 
success that his parents articulated in their journeys to the United States. He contrasts that with 
his own and how his perception of the “American Dream” is ultimately linked generationally to 
their ideas of opportunity and success. He adds that achieving that opportunity to work toward 
that dream is based on access to resources, like education and labor. Alejandro presents an 
optimistic view, similar to other Latin Americans, on succeeding in Miami. For him, the 
“American Dream” is a motivating factor that was embedded in him by his parents. Like other 
groups, both Alejandro’s parents left their homes searching for success in the United States. 
While Alejandro later shared that he does not hold an intense anti-communist stance like his 
parents, he holds on to the burden and weight of his parent’s commitment to working and 
building toward a future in Miami. 
 
99 “Alejandro,” interview by author, phone call, January 2020. 
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The “other" Latin Americans, in an attempt to reinvent their own lives, find themselves 
continuously dealing with White Cuban dominance, even while attempting to acquire any 
possible opportunity for themselves. While Cuban numbers have decreased in proportion to the 
Hispanic population since 1980, they still maintain a hegemonic presence within Miami that 
gatekeeps outside groups. For example, Dulce, a Venezuelan immigrant in cleaning services, 
criticized how Cubans have benefitted the most from the United States and the inequity 
compared to other non-Cuban Latin Americans: 
In social related matters, Cubans had a preference toward them. The Cubans would arrive 
and they [U.S. government] would give them six months, they would give them health 
care services, they would give them money for food, money for housing, so many 
resources, and then a El Salvadorian would arrive, or a Colombian would arrive, and then 
nothing. It was one of those things that there was discrimination, and they were the 
pampered ones, do you understand? They were the ones that had to receive everything 
and it’s not right because we’re all human and we all deserve the same rights....and 
everyone knows it.100 
 
Dulce’s annoyance with the inequity between Cubans and non-Cuban Latin Americans 
highlights the tension between Miami's different nationality groups and the consciousness of 
Cuban favorability: “Cubans will always pick the Cubans.” In a racially conscious society, 
Cubans were perceived as White, which facilitated how easily they could assimilate into 
American culture and uphold their glorified image. Even though some groups may come from a 
similar background like the White Cubans in their escape from a communist government it all 
boils down to falling in line with how White Cubans want to continue to be perceived and what it 





100 “Dulce,” interview and translated by author, phone call, October 2020. 
 39 
 N (000s) HISP MEX PR CUB OTH 
1980 Population Composition (%) 580 35.7 2.2 7.9 70.0 20.0 
1990 Population Composition (%) 950 49.2 2.4 7.2 59.2 31.2 
2000 Population Composition (%) 1,292 57.3 2.9 6.2 50.4 40.5 
NOTE: N = Hispanic population absolute size (000s) 
HISP = Hispanics as a percent of that city’s population 
MEX = % of Hispanics that are Mexican 
PR = % of Hispanics that are Puerto Rican 
CUB = % of Hispanics that are Cuban 
OTH = % of Hispanics that are other 
 
 
Whereas some groups may fervently believe in the American Dream and its symbolism, 
others may think it is false or applicable to few people in the United States. Americanism is 
centered on a communal ideology that unites all types of people and creates a blanketed narrative 
for success and opportunity. Yet, these ideas are based on the assumption of equal footing 
amongst people and failed to consider the intersections of race, class, and ethnicity. The mold is 
construed to fit a specific group in mind, similar to how White Cubans imposed their standards 
onto the rest of Miami.  
Karina, a Colombian immigrant medical professional, came to the United to find herself 
better opportunities in the medical field. However, she struggled to advance because of language 
barriers and licensing requirements. Karina talked about how it is difficult for working 
professionals to immigrate to the United States because you are forced to re-do your entire job 
track. It may be too time-consuming or expensive. She voiced that the American Dream was 
something from another time because unemployment and poverty prevail in the United States. 
Some immigrants never get the opportunity even to get remotely close to the occupation they had 
in their home country. While some immigrants may believe in the American Dream, others are 
Table 1. Hispanic Subgroup Composition in Miami, 1980-200.  
Source: Mary J. Fischer and Marta Tienda, “Redrawing Spatial Color Lines: Metropolitan Dispersal, Segregation, 
Economic Opportunity,” in Hispanics and the Future of America, ed. Faith Mitchell and Marta Tienda (Washington, 
D.C: National Academies Press, 2006), 136-137. 
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discouraged because of the limitations that exist for some people, forcing them to accommodate 
their lives and re-imagine a story that they probably once actively believed in.   
While Karina does not believe in it, she recognizes the preferences and difficulties with 
job opportunities in the city with Cubans, similar to Dulce: "If two Latinos are going for the 
same job, but one is Cuban, and the interviewer is Cuban – they'll hire the Cuban because they 
work to help each other."101 Karina, alongside Dulce, illustrates the struggles that non-Cuban 
Latin Americans face in penetrating the Cuban stronghold and its influence on the city. 
Elena Sabogal utilizes "new” and "old" immigrant groups models to compare between 
groups and how they perceive themselves after immigrating to Miami.102 “New” immigrant 
groups romanticize their past and struggle to accept their status once moving to the United 
States, specifically how there are not as many opportunities for them as initially believed. An 
example is seen with Alonso, a Colombian journalist, who recognizes the loss in position and 
status since moving to the United States and must be ready to "deliver pizzas."103 Compared to 
the established immigrants, some immigrants do not have the same network to rely on, especially 
in a city dominated by Cubans, because of the time it takes to build a community. From the 
earliest arrivals, Cubans have been making their community for over half a century, while other 
groups have only arrived within the last two decades. Nevertheless, immigrant groups build off 
of each other as areas and communities over time with each immigration wave that comes after. 
Terry F. Buss and Marcela Tribble highlight this by drawing reference to Flagler Street's 
transformation from being dominated by Anglo and Jewish residents to “Little Havana” to the 
 
101 “Karina", interview and translated by author, phone call, October 2020. 
102 Elena Sabogal, “Denaturalized Identities: Class-Based Perceptions of Self and Others among Latin 
American Immigrants in South Florida,” Latino Studies 10, no. 4 (2012): 546–65. 
103 Sabogal. "When I was on the way here with every intention of staying, I remembered that song by John 
Lennon, "Life Starting Over" on the airplane. That's how I felt as if I had to begin all over again. The precise 
moment we all understand that we are starting over again is when we're delivering pizza, for example." 
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“Latin Quarter” after Cubans left for the suburbs.104 These new Latin American immigrants 
groups struggled to create that foundation and lacked a model to follow that had welcomed them 
with and pushed for their American Dream. On the other hand, the established White Cubans 
held on to the control they had over the city to ensure their dream's longevity by supporting the 
newly arrived immigrant that was most like them and creating infrastructures that were ready for 
the continuity of this standard. 
New immigrant groups may be perceived as inferior because they may fail to meet the 
standards of White Cubans in opportunity, success, and dreams, regardless of whether they might 
have similar stories and backgrounds. It may be a lack of sufficient anti-communist sentiment or 
desires for capitalistic success. It may come down to have subsequent groups racialized 
differently, especially groups who are farther away from Whiteness. 
Ramona, a Dominican immigrant, addresses the intraethnic discrimination by labeling it 
as “Cubanismo” and drawing attention to similar conflicts brought up by Dulce on the Cuban 
favoritism by U.S. policies and their “positions of power as the ‘owners’ of the city.” Elizabeth 
Arranda makes a note of the distinction is made between different non-Cubans and Cubans and 
how it contributes to a larger discourse of “Hispanic-on-Hispanic” discrimination, or, in Miami’s 
case, “Cuban-on-non-Cuban discrimination.”  Emilia, a Peruvian immigrant, builds on this by 
explaining how she perceives Cubans as thinking that they are different from every other non-
Cuban, thus creating distance between them.105  
As White Cuban and Cuban Americans continue to maintain control over the city, a 
hegemonic rule is placed on the city that prevents some groups from succeeding as the groups 
 
104 Terry F. Buss and Marcela Tribble, “Paradise Lost?: Miami, Immigration, and Economic Development,” 
International Journal of Economic Development 5, no. 2 (2003). 
105 Arranda, Making a Life in Multiethnic Miami. 223 
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that came before them similarly. A competitive environment is meshed into Miami’s atmosphere 
as different groups, scattered across the city, begin a tug-of-war trying to find and solidify their 
perceptions of the American Dream and home within the United States. However, the chance to 
obtain that success varies each time, but it does not change that their motivation to grab on to 
their “piece of the pie” in transforming the city, similar to how White Cubans have done in the 
past. 
 
A Dream on Edge 
 On November 1, 2020, an opinion article titled “Obituaries for the American Dream” was 
published in The New York Times. They start the piece by asking the following questions: “But 
what’s a dream anyway? A brimming over of the day’s repressed desires? Just a flutter of the 
Neurons?” Lizania Cruz, a Dominican artist and curator, reexamines what the “American 
Dream” is and what it means to people, but more importantly, did that dream ever exist? She 
argues that the country’s “American Dream” had lived for 89 years, but the dream had died 
faster for some.106  
Bill Stoddart, a resident from Montana, captures his feelings of discontent with American 
society and its values: 
The American dream died for me when I realized our allegiance to the myth of rugged 
individualism has completely overwhelmed our willingness and ability to lift others up. It 
seems we have decided there is only so much pie available, so we better get what we can 
without realizing that in buying into a zero sum game, we have made a bargain that not 
only limits our own ability to thrive but prevents others from doing so as well. 107 
 
 
106  “Obituaries for the American Dream,” The New York Times, November 1, 2020, sec. Opinion, 
www.nytimes.com/2020/11/01/opinion/american-dream-stories.html. 
107 Obituaries for the American Dream.” 
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Stoddart criticizes the American Dream by pointing out a falsified narrative created to limit 
others yet push ourselves forward. The American Dream, or rather Americanism, operates under 
the guise of communal patriotism to garner unity, but interestingly enough, it exemplifies 
individualized competition. It exhibits the push-and-pull of American capitalism as people search 
to find their sweet spot of opportunity. In turn, the individualism espoused, evidently seen in 
heterogeneous societies like Miami, inherently pits groups against each other as some groups 
elevate and succeed. In contrast, others are curtailed from being able to achieve their success. 
The American Dream is rooted in a competition that gatekeeps opportunity, placing winners at 
the top while everyone must attempt to be the next winner in the game.  
 The “Cubanized American Dream” in Miami centers on the desires, standards, and values 
of White Cubans, creating a hegemonic model for subsequent Latin American immigrants in 
Miami to follow. It fails to consider the repercussions of obstructed opportunity for other Latin 
Americans. It pushes and sponsors uphold an individualistic competition amongst groups, 
fighting to see who has access to opportunity. Cuban dominance dictates and gatekeeps 
opportunity for the other groups, and thus, as Stoddart says, buy into a “zero sum game.” Other 
Latin Americans are forced to bargain their identity and place for a seat at the table in hopes of 
pursuing their own American Dream. By giving in to Americanism, immigrant groups accept the 
terms and conditions that their success is based on differentiating themselves and pushing 
themselves forward while pushing others down, especially those racialized differently. This is 
evident in Miami with the Cubans and the Mariel exiles, Nicaraguans and the Haitians, and again 
with “established” immigrants and the “new” immigrants – there is always a power struggle 
amongst groups. Damian, a Colombian immigrant, comments on this intraethnic tension: 
“Sometimes intolerance comes from ourselves...It is Cuba against Colombia...It is Cuba against 
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Nicaragua...Nicaragua against Panama...If we ourselves cannot stand each other, how are going 
to form a united group so that the rest of the world will respect us?”108 
As different ethnicities and nationalities compete against each other, the prophecy of 
American capitalism is unleashed. They are initiated into being White ambassadors and 
advocates for the United States in their attempt to validate their experiences as Americans; 
however, the invitations fall flat as some groups are perceived or not validated as being part of 
this global struggle. A White Cuban establishment upholds these values and gatekeeps the 
opportunities that may be selectively granted to other groups that may fall qualify in Miami as 
power was transformed from one White ruling elite class to another. 
The hegemonic strength of the White establishment is evident in the 2020 United States 
elections where Incumbent Democrat Debbie Mucarsel-Power lost to Carlos A. Giménez in 
getting re-elected for Florida’s 26th congressional district seat in Miami. Mucarsel-Powell was 
the first Ecuadorian and South American-born immigrant to serve in the U.S. Congress 
representing a district whose demographics were slowly changing. Carlos Giménez, on the other 
hand, is a Cuban-born immigrant that came to the United States with his family during the first 
wave of Cuban immigration. The unseating of a non-Cuban Latin American to a White Cuban 
provides a glimpse into how intraethnic tension continues to prevail in Miami as the groups push 
and pull for opportunities, evidenced by how Mucarsel-Powell had unseated a Cuban in the 2016 
election.109  
Tension remains a continuous thread woven into the history of South Florida and Miami. 
As a South Floridian myself, I understood and witnessed the conflict that came with different 
 
108 Arranda, Making a Life in Multiethnic Miami, 223. 
109 Ryan Nicol, “Debbie Mucarsel-Powell concedes defeat to Carlos Giménez following Tuesday’s results”, 
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perceptions of one another, specifically how non-Cubans were never given the same 
opportunities. American exceptionalism and belief in achieving economic success is prevalent in 
Latin American immigrants' work ethic and culture within the city, whether from Latin America. 
It is almost an unconscious understanding of how immigrants, and the generations that follow, 
are actors in a more significant geopolitical battle against ideologies that were deemed as 
“deviant” and “wrong.” However, I do not believe that their experiences and perceptions should 
be diminished because of possible U.S. propaganda. Instead, the conversation surrounding the 
“American Dream” should be looked at in thinking about how these realities reflect how 
opportunity and success are mythologized in immigrant communities, specifically Latin America 
in this context, and used as a guiding principle for movement. 
As a case study, Miami exhibits how prevailing Cold War attitudes transcend borders and 
manifests itself in the perceptions of different actors. Ramon Grosfoguel argues that “Miami 
emerged as the antithesis in Communist Cuba, promoting the success of American capitalism 
and democracy,” aligning with the Americanism espoused by Latin American immigrants.110 
However, I’d expand Miami’s significance in arguing that Miami is not only antithesis to 
Communist Cuba, but also to the suspected communist; it could even be seen as a surrogate 
country, or home instead, for Latin Americans. Whether or not they intend to be ambassadors for 
the United States, Latin American immigrants are caught in the ongoing geopolitical legacy and 
struggle manifested through the American Dream – a dream rooted in Whiteness. 
The “American Dream” is an idea placed on a pedestal by the United States to garner 
support for the country during the Cold War It is a tool that White Cubans use to justify their 
legitimacy as the Golden Exiles and impose on other groups where their success was contingent 
 
110 Ramon Grosfoguel, “World Cities in the Caribbean,” quoted in Arranda, Chang, and Sabogal, 
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on capitalism, anti-communism, and Whiteness. Its legacies are felt across all levels through 
statistical data, interviews, and scholarship, where the constant reimagining of what success and 
opportunity continues to this day. As Latin Americans left their homelands for a better 
tomorrow, they were attracted to the ideas of opportunity and success yet failed to understand the 
consequences that would come subsequently. The intraethnic and ethnoracial tensions within 
Miami are an effect of how the American Dream pits groups against each other as they attempt 
to redefine what opportunity means for them in the United States At the same time, they navigate 
their proximity to Whiteness and Americanness. Conflicts over the American Dream, success, 
and opportunity pose the question of whether the dream has faded for new Latin American 
immigrants or if its transformation reflects the continuous conflict over resources, infrastructure, 
and race. The perceptions of such opportunistic ideas shift over time as they ask themselves the 
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